Defending the right

Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (1):85-98 (2007)
Abstract
In this paper I consider what might be my best response to various difficulties and challenges that emerged at a conference held at the University of Kent in December 2004, the contributions to which are given in the same volume. I comment on Crisp's distinction between ultimate and non-ultimate reasons, and reply to McKeever and Ridge on default reasons, and to Norman on the idea of a reason for action. I don't here consider what other particularists might want to say; I certainly don't think that my way of doing these things is the only possible one, but not surprisingly I am interested in seeing what resources it might have to defend itself. Key Words: default • favouring • particularism • reasons • right-making.
Keywords right-making   default   reasons   particularism   favouring
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DOI 10.1177/1740468106072790
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