Oxford University Press (2004)

Authors
Jonathan Dancy
University of Texas at Austin
Abstract
In this much-anticipated book, Jonathan Dancy offers the only available full-scale treatment of particularism in ethics, a view with which he has been associated for twenty years. Dancy now presents particularism as the view that the possibility of moral thought and judgement does not in any way depend on an adequate supply of principles. He grounds this claim on a form of reasons-holism, holding that what is a reason in one case need not be any reason in another, and maintaining that moral reasons are no different in this respect from others. Ethics Without Principles offers detailed treatment and criticism of opposing positions of all sorts, with useful summaries. It also contains three chapters on the nature of what Dancy calls 'contributory' reasons, which, though the topic of much interest at the moment, are not often discussed in anything like the detail given here. And it offers a distinctive form of value-holism to go with the holism of reasons. As Dancy's definitive statement on particularism, the book will be required reading for all those working on moral philosophy and ethical theory.
Keywords Ethics  Principle (Philosophy
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Reprint years 2005, 2006
Buy this book $42.61 new (5% off)   $44.95 from Amazon    $53.02 used   Amazon page
Call number BJ1012.D262 2004
ISBN(s) 0199297681   0199270023   9780199297689   9780199270026
DOI 10.1215/00318108-2006-027
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Chapters BETA
Beyond Favouring

Suggests ways of characterising the favouring relation by contrasting it with other forms of relevance, such as enabling and intensifying. Offers examples of the distinction between favouring and enabling in the theory of explanation and in epistemology.

Knowing Reasons

A chapter on moral epistemology. Asks what, for the particularist, will count as a basic moral fact. Considers the modal status of such facts, arguing that they are contingent, but known a priori. Claims that this position is neither foundationalist nor coherentist. Ends by considering var... see more

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Against Grounding Necessitarianism.Alexander Skiles - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (4):717-751.
The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
The Unity of Grounding.Selim Berker - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):729-777.
What is Inference?Paul Boghossian - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (1):1-18.
Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning.Jonathan Way - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (2).

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