Frege's Commitment to an Infinite Hierarchy of Senses

Philosophical Papers 32 (1):31-64 (2003)
Abstract Though it has been claimed that Frege's commitment to expressions in indirect contexts not having their customary senses commits him to an infinite number of semantic primitives, Terrence Parsons has argued that Frege's explicit commitments are compatible with a two-level theory of senses. In this paper, we argue Frege is committed to some principles Parsons has overlooked, and, from these and other principles to which Frege is committed, give a proof that he is indeed committed to an infinite number of semantic primitives?an intolerable result
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DOI 10.1080/05568640309485112
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Ofra Magidor (2009). Category Mistakes Are Meaningful. Linguistics and Philosophy 32 (6):553-581.

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