Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 (4):535-572 (1997)
AbstractReasoning about situations we take to be impossible is useful for a variety of theoretical purposes. Furthermore, using a device of impossible worlds when reasoning about the impossible is useful in the same sorts of ways that the device of possible worlds is useful when reasoning about the possible. This paper discusses some of the uses of impossible worlds and argues that commitment to them can and should be had without great metaphysical or logical cost. The paper then provides an account of reasoning with impossible worlds, by treating such reasoning as reasoning employing counterpossible conditionals, and provides a semantics for the proposed treatment
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Citations of this work
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References found in this work
Two Concepts of Possible Worlds.Peter van Inwagen - 1986 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11 (1):185-213.