Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (4):197-197 (2011)

Authors
David Danks
Carnegie Mellon University
Frederick Eberhardt
California Institute of Technology
Abstract
We argue that the authors’ call to integrate Bayesian models more strongly with algorithmic- and implementational-level models must go hand in hand with a call for a fully developed account of algorithmic rationality. Without such an account, the integration of levels would come at the expense of the explanatory benefit that rational models provide
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DOI 10.1017/s0140525x11000240
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