Moral Reasons

Blackwell (1993)

Authors
Jonathan Dancy
University of Texas at Austin
Abstract
This book attempts to place a realist view of ethics (the claim that there are facts of the matter in ethics as elsewhere) within a broader context. It starts with a discussion of why we should mind about the difference between right and wrong, asks what account we should give of our ability to learn from our moral experience, and looks in some detail at the different sorts of ways in which moral reasons can combine to show us what we should do in the circumstances. The second half of the book uses these results to mount an attack on consequentialism in ethics, arguing that there are more sorts of reasons around than consequentialists can even dream of.
Keywords Ethics
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Call number BJ1012.D263 1993
ISBN(s) 0631187928     9780631187929   0631177752 (hbk)
DOI 10.2307/2219861
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Holism, Weight, and Undercutting.Mark Schroeder - 2011 - Noûs 45 (2):328 - 344.
Intuition, Inference, and Rational Disagreement in Ethics.Robert Audi - 2008 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (5):475-492.
A Core Precautionary Principle.Stephen M. Gardiner - 2006 - Journal of Political Philosophy 14 (1):33–60.

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