Moral Reasons

Blackwell (1993)
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Abstract

This book attempts to place a realist view of ethics (the claim that there are facts of the matter in ethics as elsewhere) within a broader context. It starts with a discussion of why we should mind about the difference between right and wrong, asks what account we should give of our ability to learn from our moral experience, and looks in some detail at the different sorts of ways in which moral reasons can combine to show us what we should do in the circumstances. The second half of the book uses these results to mount an attack on consequentialism in ethics, arguing that there are more sorts of reasons around than consequentialists can even dream of.

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Jonathan Dancy
University of Texas at Austin

Citations of this work

The Unity of Grounding.Selim Berker - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):729-777.
A Clarification and Defense of the Notion of Grounding.Paul Audi - 2012 - In Fabrice Correia & Benjamin Schnieder (eds.), Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality. Cambridge University Press. pp. 101-121.
Emotional Justification.Santiago Echeverri - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (3):541-566.
Émotions et Valeurs.Christine Tappolet - 2000 - Presses Universitaires de France.

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