Negative and Positive Genetic Interventions: Is There a Moral Boundary?

Science in Context 11 (3-4):439-453 (1998)
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Abstract

The ArgumentSome have claimed that negative genetic interventions are morally permissible while positive ones are not, but the distinction cannot be used to draw this moral boundary. Underlying the negative/positive distinction is a distinction between treatment and enhancement. The treatment/enhancement distinction at best provides an imperfect guide to which health care services we are obliged to provide and which we are not. It offers only some “warning flags” to help us think about what is permissible or not.

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Political Liberalism.John Rawls - 1993 - Columbia University Press.
Political Liberalism.J. Rawls - 1995 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 57 (3):596-598.
Health as a theoretical concept.Christopher Boorse - 1977 - Philosophy of Science 44 (4):542-573.

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