Filosofia Unisinos 18 (3):195-200 (2017)

Danilo Fraga Dantas
Federal University of Paraiba
All reasoners described in the most widespread models of a rational reasoner exhibit logical omniscience, which is impossible for finite reasoners (real reasoners). The most common strategy for dealing with the problem of logical omniscience is to interpret the models using a notion of beliefs different from explicit beliefs. For example, the models could be interpreted as describing the beliefs that the reasoner would hold if the reasoner were able reason indefinitely (stable beliefs). Then the models would describe maximum rationality, which a finite reasoner can only approach in the limit of a reasoning sequence. This strategy has important consequences for epistemology. If a finite reasoner can only approach maximum rationality in the limit of a reasoning sequence, then the efficiency of reasoning is epistemically (and not only pragmatically) relevant. In this paper, I present an argument to this conclusion and discuss its consequences, as, for example, the vindication of the principle 'no rationality through brute-force'.
Keywords Finite Reasoning  Logical Omniscience   Efficient Reasoning  Asymptotic analysis  Computational complexity
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Reprint years 2017
DOI 10.4013/fsu.2017.183.11
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The Theory of Epistemic Rationality.Richard Foley - 1987 - Harvard University Press.
The Theory of Epistemic Rationality.Hilary Kornblith & Richard Foley - 1990 - Philosophical Review 99 (1):131.
Possible Worlds.Christopher Menzel - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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