Abstract
I develop and argue for a kind of externalism about certain kinds of non-doxastic attitudes that I call policy externalism. Policy externalism about a given type of attitude is the view that all the reasonable policies for having attitudes of that type will not involve the agent's beliefs that some relevant conditions obtain. My defense primarily involves attitudes like hatred, regret, and admiration, and has two parts: a direct deductive argument and an indirect linguistic argument, an inference to the best explanation of some strange ways we use certain conditionals. The main thought throughout is that attitudes we reason with, like belief, are very different from attitudes we don't reason with, in a way that constrains the former but not the latter. Finally, I investigate some consequences of policy externalism, including that it secures the possibility of genuine conditional apologies.
Keywords Non-doxastic attitudes  Externalism  Conditionals
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2019
DOI 10.1111/phpr.12425
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
The Meaning of 'Meaning'.Hillary Putnam - 1975 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:131-193.

View all 69 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

A New Hope.Kyle H. Blumberg & John Hawthorne - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy.
Embedded Attitudes.Kyle Blumberg & Ben Holguín - 2019 - Journal of Semantics 36 (3):377-406.
The Attitudes We Can Have.Daniel Drucker - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (4):591-642.
Revisionist Reporting.Kyle Blumberg & Harvey Lederman - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):755-783.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Why Externalism is Not a Problem for Ethical Intuitionists.Philip Stratton-Lake - 1999 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1):77–90.
Semantic Externalism and Psychological Externalism.Åsa Wikforss - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (1):158-181.
Externalism and Knowledge of the Attitudes.John Gibbons - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (202):13-28.
Colour Inversion Problems for Representationalism.Fiona Macpherson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):127-152.
Temporal Externalism.Tom Stoneham - 2003 - Philosophical Papers 32 (1):97-107.
Active Content Externalism.Holger Lyre - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):17-33.
The Depths and Shallows of Psychological Externalism.Andrew Sneddon - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (3):393 - 408.
Semantic Internalism and Externalism.Katalin Farkas - 2006 - In Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press. pp. 323.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2017-01-27

Total views
122 ( #88,984 of 2,455,781 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
8 ( #84,338 of 2,455,781 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes