Practical Reality

Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press (2000)
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Abstract

Practical Reality is a lucid original study of the relation between the reasons why we do things and the reasons why we should. Jonathan Dancy maintains that current philosophical orthodoxy bowdlerizes this relation, making it impossible to understand how anyone can act for a good reason. By giving a fresh account of values and reasons, he finds a place for normativity in philosophy of mind and action, and strengthens the connection between these areas and ethics

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Jonathan Dancy
University of Texas at Austin

Citations of this work

The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):3-44.
Vice Epistemology.Quassim Cassam - 2016 - The Monist 99 (2):159-180.
The Importance of Being Rational.Errol Lord - 2013 - Dissertation, Princeton University
What's wrong with Moore's argument?James Pryor - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349–378.

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