Abstract

The intent of this dissertation is to set forth the philosophical and theological groundwork for appropriating Richard Rorty's metaphilosophical critique into theological terms. It is a work that blurs the boundaries between contemporary philosophy, the philosophy of religion, philosophical theology, and theology. It is situated within the death of God as interpreted by the French theologian Gabriel Vahanian. ;The first chapter outlines Vahanian's sense of the death of God, and how it parallels Rorty's understanding of the "demise of the philosophical tradition." Of importance is how these trends within theological and philosophical thought render obsolete traditional issues in the philosophy of religion. ;Chapter two is devoted to Rorty's analysis of traditional philosophy, traced from Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature to the third volume of his philosophical papers Truth and Progress. Of central importance is the language of traditional philosophy, with particular detail given to the nature of objectivity, rationality, the "scientific method," and truth. The third section of this chapter develops Rorty's distinction between systematic and edifying philosophies as described in his Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. This distinction serves as the basis for a similar case made in theology. ;The third chapter explores the ethical implications of Rorty's position as applied to the philosophy of education. Here I compare a Rortyan view of values education to that of a realist's account. The second part of this chapter examines Rorty's sense of ethics as the inculcation of sentimentality. ;In chapter four I explore how Rorty's distinction between systematic and edifying philosophies can be applied in the theological context, distinguishing between systematic and edifying theologies. With respect to systematic theology, I argue that similar philosophy, theological discourse was infected by systematic philosophy, obscuring and redefining its theoretical and practical field of investigations. Edifying theology, similar to edifying philosophy, turns from robust metaphysical inquiry to the Deweyan problems of society. In the last part of this chapter I discuss how edifying theology, while sharing edifying philosophy's pragmatic concerns, remains uniquely theological. ;The fifth chapter turns to an account of the philosophy of religion as developed in a recent unpublished manuscript by Rorty. I pay particular attention to how this account is compatible with edifying theology. The second half of this chapter deals with Alvin Plantinga's forthcoming book on warrant and Christian belief. Plantinga seeks to show that whatever sense can be made of Rorty's position, it does not offer "defeaters" for Christian belief. I argue that Plantinga is right but for the wrong reason. That is, while Rorty's view of truth does not offer defeaters for Christian belief, the reason is not because Rorty's view is incoherent. Rather, read fairly and charitably, Rorty's view is not only coherent, but as well quite compatible with some interpretations of Christian belief