Should we pass the buck?

Abstract
My topic is the relation between the right and the good. I introduce it by relating some aspects of the debate between various British intuitionists in the first half of the present century. In Principia Ethica G. E. Moore claimed that to be right is to be productive of the greatest good. He wrote ‘This use of “right”, as denoting what is good as a means, whether or not it be also good as an end, is indeed the use to which I shall confine the word’ . By the time he wrote his Ethics he seems to have weakened his position, and offers conduciveness to the good not as a definition of ‘right’ but as an account of the one and only property that makes acts right. Even if it be the only right-making property, conduciveness to the good will not be identical with the right-ness that it makes
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2006
DOI 10.1017/S1358246100006974
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,781
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Principia Ethica.G. E. Moore - 1903 - Dover Publications.
The Right and the Good.W. D. Ross - 1930 - Clarendon Press.
The Definition of Good.A. C. Ewing - 1948 - Hyperion Press.

View all 7 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
The Normativity of Artefacts.Maarten Franssen - 2006 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (1):42-57.
De Dicto Desires and Morality as Fetish.Vanessa Carbonell - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):459-477.
G. E. Moore on Goodness and Reasons.Jonas Olson - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):525 – 534.
Legal Obligation and Reasons.Christopher Essert - 2013 - Legal Theory 19 (1):63-88.
The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Resisting the Buck-Passing Account of Value.Pekka Väyrynen - 2006 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 1. Oxford University Press. pp. 295-324.
Resisting Buck-Passing Accounts of Prudential Value.Guy Fletcher - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (1):77-91.
The Epistemic Significance of Address.Benjamin McMyler - 2013 - Synthese 190 (6):1059-1078.
The Buck-Passing Account of Value: Lessons From Crisp.S. Matthew Liao - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (3):421 - 432.
Rate Abuse: A Reply to Olson.Ian Phillips - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):503-505.
Reasons and Value – in Defence of the Buck-Passing Account.Jussi Suikkanen - 2005 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (5):513 - 535.
What's Wrong with Moorean Buck-Passing?Francesco Orsi - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):727-746.
Naturalism and the Buck-Passing Account of Value.Francesco Orsi - 2006 - Philosophical Writings 32 (2):58-77.
G. E. Moore on Goodness and Reasons.Jonas Olson - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):525 – 534.
Hegel, Haiti and Universal History.Susan Buck-Morss - 2009 - University of Pittsburgh Press.
Added to PP index
2010-09-14

Total downloads
177 ( #26,871 of 2,199,426 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
6 ( #35,230 of 2,199,426 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature