“The story says that” operator in story semantics

Studia Logica 46 (1):73-86 (1987)
In [2] a semantics for implication is offered that makes use of stories — sets of sentences assembled under various constraints. Sentences are evaluated at an actual world and in each member of a set of stories. A sentence B is true in a story s just when B s. A implies B iff for all stories and the actual world, whenever A is true, B is true. In this article the first-order language of [2] is extended by the addition of the operator the story... says that..., as in The story Flashman among the Redskins says that Flashman met Sitting Bull. The resulting language is shown to be sound and complete
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DOI 10.1007/BF00396906
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Richard Routley (1982). On What There is Not. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 43 (2):151-177.

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