Erkenntnis:1-25 (forthcoming)

Authors
Marc-Kevin Daoust
Harvard University
Charles Cote-Bouchard
Université de Montréal
Abstract
We argue that there is a tension between two monistic claims that are the core of recent work in epistemic consequentialism. The first is a form of monism about epistemic value, commonly known as veritism: accuracy is the sole final objective to be promoted in the epistemic domain. The other is a form of monism about a class of epistemic scoring rules: that is, strictly proper scoring rules are the only legitimate measures of inaccuracy. These two monisms, we argue, are in tension with each other. If only accuracy has final epistemic value, then there are legitimate alternatives to strictly proper scoring rules. Our argument relies on the way scoring rules are used in contexts where accuracy is rewarded, such as education.
Keywords epistemic consequentialism  epistemic utility theory  accuracy-first epistemology  scoring rules  epistemic value  value of truth  epistemic norms
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-021-00426-5
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References found in this work BETA

Accuracy and the Laws of Credence.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - Oxford University Press UK.
The Importance of Being Rational.Errol Lord - 2018 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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