Peer Disagreement and the Bridge Principle

Topoi:1-11 (forthcoming)
Authors
Marc-Kevin Daoust
Université de Montréal
Abstract
One explanation of rational peer disagreement is that agents find themselves in an epistemically permissive situation. In fact, some authors have suggested that, while evidence could be impermissive at the intrapersonal level, it is permissive at the interpersonal level. In this paper, I challenge such a claim. I will argue that, at least in cases of rational disagreement under full disclosure, there cannot be more interpersonal epistemically permissive situations than there are intrapersonal epistemically permissive situations. In other words, with respect to cases of disagreement under full disclosure, I will argue that there is a necessary connection between interpersonal permissiveness and its intrapersonal counterpart. Specifically, I claim that a plausible principle of correct argumentation supports such a bridge.
Keywords epistemic rationality  uniqueness  permissiveness  permissivism  argumentation  epistemic peer  evidence
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DOI 10.1007/s11245-018-9595-8
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References found in this work BETA

Epistemic Permissiveness.Roger White - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.
Uniqueness and Metaepistemology.Daniel Greco & Brian Hedden - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (8):365-395.
Immoderately Rational.Sophie Horowitz - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):41-56.

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