Synthese 197 (10):4551-4569 (2020)

Authors
Marc-Kevin Daoust
Harvard University
Abstract
Is epistemic inconsistency a mere symptom of having violated other requirements of rationality—notably, reasons-responsiveness requirements? Or is inconsistency irrational on its own? This question has important implications for the debate on the normativity of epistemic rationality. In this paper, I defend a new account of the explanatory role of the requirement of epistemic consistency. Roughly, I will argue that, in cases where an epistemically rational agent is permitted to believe P and also permitted to disbelieve P, the consistency requirement plays a distinct explanatory role. I will also argue that such a type of permissiveness is a live possibility when it comes to rational epistemic standards.
Keywords rationality  consistency  epistemic reasons  requirements  permissiveness  permissivism
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-018-01942-8
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References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Epistemology and Cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Harvard University Press.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas M. Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.

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