Motivational realism: The natural classification for Pierre Duhem

Philosophy of Science 70 (5):1125-1136 (2003)
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Abstract

This paper addresses a central interpretive problem in understanding Pierre Duhem's philosophy of science. The problem arises because there is textual support for both realist and antirealist readings of his work. I argue that his realist and antirealist claims are different. For Duhem, scientific reasoning leads straight to antirealism. But intuition (reasons of the heart) motivates, without justifying, a kind of realism. I develop this idea to suggest a motivational realist interpretation of Duhem's philosophy.

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Citations of this work

Conventionalism About What? Where Duhem and Poincaré Part Ways.Milena Ivanova - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 54:80-89.
Pierre Duhem.Roger Ariew - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Rationale Behind Pierre Duhem's Natural Classification.Sindhuja Bhakthavatsalam - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 51:11-21.
Phenomenotechnique: Bachelard's Critical Inheritance of Conventionalism.Lucie Fabry - 2019 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 75:34-42.

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References found in this work

The Logic of Scientific Discovery.Karl Popper - 1959 - Studia Logica 9:262-265.
Conjectures and Refutations.K. Popper - 1963 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 21 (3):431-434.
The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory.Pierre Duhem & Philip P. Wiener - 1955 - Science and Society 19 (1):85-87.
Instrumentalism and its Critique: A Reappraisal.Jerzy Giedymin - 1976 - In R. S. Cohen, P. K. Feyerabend & M. Wartofsky (eds.), Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos. Reidel. pp. 179--207.

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