Putting the Burden of Proof in Its Place: When Are Differential Allocations Legitimate?

Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (4):503-518 (2008)

Authors
Justine Kingsbury
University of Waikato
Abstract
To have the burden of proof is to be rationally required to argue for or provide evidence for your position. To have a heavier burden than an opponent is to be rationally required to provide better evidence or better arguments than they are required to provide. Many commentators suggest that differential or uneven distribution of the burden of proof is ubiquitous. In reasoned discourse, the idea goes, it is almost always the case that one party must prove the claim at issue to prevent the opposing view winning by default. The following passage is typical of the sort of thing one finds in critical thinking textbooks
Keywords burden of proof  truth-directedness
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 0038-4283
DOI 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2008.tb00082.x
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 46,330
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Science, the Very Idea.Steve Woolgar - 1988 - Tavistock Publications.
The Scientific Image.Bas C. Fraassen - 1983 - Mind 92 (366):291-293.
The Works of Thomas Reid.Thomas Reid - 1895 - James Thin Longmans, Green & Co.
Primary Philosophy.Michael Scriven - 1966 - New York: Mcgraw-Hill.

View all 8 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

On Deontic Truth and Values.J. J. Moreso - 2017 - Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía 49 (146):61-74.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Burden of Proof Rules in Social Criticism.Juha Räikkä - 1997 - Argumentation 11 (4):463-477.
Beweislastverteilung und Intuitionen in philosophischen Diskursen.Thorsten Sander - 2003 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 34 (1):69-97.
A Formal Model of Adjudication Dialogues.Henry Prakken - 2008 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 16 (3):305-328.
Evidence, Proof, and Facts: A Book of Sources.Peter Murphy (ed.) - 2003 - New York ;Oxford University Press.
Evidence and Proof.William L. Twining & Alex Stein (eds.) - 1992 - New York University Press.
The Weights of Evidence.Dale A. Nance - 2008 - Episteme 5 (3):pp. 267-281.
How Should Philosophy Be Clear? Loaded Clarity, Default Clarity, and Adorno.Nicholas Joll - 2009 - Telos: Critical Theory of the Contemporary 2009 (146):73–95.
Compatibilism and the Burden of Proof.Peter van Inwagen - 1980 - Analysis 40 (March):98-100.
Shifting the Burden of Proof?Michael Rescorla - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):86-109.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2010-09-14

Total views
639 ( #6,305 of 2,285,991 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
72 ( #10,548 of 2,285,991 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature