Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3):577-598 (1993)
Causally committed properties are properties which require that their instances have a cause (or an effect) of a certain kind. Sunburn, for instance, must be caused by the sun. Causal relevance is a contingent dependency relation between properties of events. The connection between a causally committed property and the property to which it is committed is not contingent. Hence a pair consisting of a causally committed property and the property to which it is committed should not be in the causal relevance relation. I formulate conditions on the causal relevance relation designed to rule out causally committed properties. These conditions entail that being a propositional attitude is not causally relevant to being an action. (Nevertheless reasons can cause actions.)
|Keywords||causation logical connection causal relevance Davidson reasons and causes|
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Mental Causation: The Mind-Body Problem. By Anthony Dardis.Holly K. Andersen - 2010 - Metaphilosophy 41 (3):450-455.
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