Sunburn: Independence conditions on causal relevance

Causally committed properties are properties which require that their instances have a cause (or an effect) of a certain kind. Sunburn, for instance, must be caused by the sun. Causal relevance is a contingent dependency relation between properties of events. The connection between a causally committed property and the property to which it is committed is not contingent. Hence a pair consisting of a causally committed property and the property to which it is committed should not be in the causal relevance relation. I formulate conditions on the causal relevance relation designed to rule out causally committed properties. These conditions entail that being a propositional attitude is not causally relevant to being an action. (Nevertheless reasons can cause actions.)
Keywords causation  logical connection  causal relevance  Davidson  reasons and causes
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DOI 10.2307/2108081
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D. Gene Witmer (2003). Functionalism and Causal Exclusion. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (2):198-214.

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