Two kinds of respect

Ethics 88 (1):36-49 (1977)
  Copy   BIBTEX


S. 39: "My project in this paper is to develop the initial distinction which I have drawn between recognition and appraisal respect into a more detailed and specific account of each. These accounts will not merely be of intrinsic interest. Ultimately I will use them to illuminate the puzzles with which this paper began and to understand the idea of self-respect." 42 " Thus, insofar as respect within such a pursuit will depend on an appraisal of the participant from the perspective of whatever standards are held to be appropriate to the pursuit, such respect will depend on a judgement to which excellences of character are thought relevant. Note that exactly what aspect of the person's character is thought to be relevant in this instance is his recognition respect (or lack of it) for the standards of the pursuit." 44 "This attitude fails of being appraisal respect in that my having it toward the person is conditional on those traits being such as to make him server a particular purpose that I happen to have" 44 - 45 "To sum up: Appraisal respect is an attitude of positibe appraisal of a person either judged as a person or as engaged in some more specific pursuit. In the first case, the appropriate grounds are features of the person's character: dispositions to act for particular reasons or a higher-level disposition to act for the best reasons. In the second case, though features of character do not exhaust the appropriate grounds for appraisal respect, some such character traits will be relevant (recognition respect for the standards of a particular pursuit). Also, the other features which constitute the appoprate excellences of the pursuit must be related to traits of character in the way specified. In both cases, the positive appraisal of the person, and of his traits, must be categorical. It cannot depend on the fact that the person, because of his traits, serves an interest or purpose of one's own." 45 "To have recognition respect for someone as a person is to give appropriate weight to the fact that he or she is a person by being willing to constrain one's behaviour in ways required by that fact." 45 "This is rather different from having an attitude of appraisal respect for someone as a person. The latter is a positive appraisal oif an individual made with regard ti those features which are excellences of persons. As such, it is not owed to everone, for it may or may not be merited. When it is, what is merited is just the positive appraisal itself." 47 "Second, the only beings who are approriate objects of appraisal respect are those who are capable of acting for reasons and hence capable of conceiving of various facts as meriting more or less consideration in deliberation."



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,038

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Respect for Everything.David Schmidtz - 2011 - Ethics, Policy and Environment 14 (2):127-138.
Three types of self-respect.David Middleton - 2006 - Res Publica 12 (1):59-76.
Arrogance, self-respect and personhood.Robin S. Dillon - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (5-6):101-126.
Kant on respect, dignity, and the duty of respect.Stephen Darwall - 2008 - In Monika Betzler (ed.), Kant's Ethics of Virtues. De Gruyter. pp. 175-200.
Justifying a respect for nature.Gene Spitler - 1982 - Environmental Ethics 4 (3):255-260.
The Respect Fallacy: Limits of Respect in Public Dialogue.Italo Testa - 2012 - In Christian Kock & Lisa Villadsen (ed.), Rhetorical Citizenship and Public Deliberation. Pennsylvania State University Press.
The confucian notion of Jing (respect).Sin Yee Chan - 2006 - Philosophy East and West 56 (2):229 - 252.


Added to PP

958 (#14,558)

6 months
113 (#36,423)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Stephen Darwall
Yale University

Citations of this work

An Epistemic Non-Consequentialism.Kurt L. Sylvan - 2020 - The Philosophical Review 129 (1):1-51.
Veritism Unswamped.Kurt Sylvan - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):381-435.
Ontic Injustice.Katharine Jenkins - 2020 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 6 (2):188-205.
Respect and the Basis of Equality.Ian Carter - 2011 - Ethics 121 (3):538-571.
Intrinsic vs. extrinsic value.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

View all 469 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references