Research in Phenomenology 37 (2):203-218 (2007)

Paul Ricoeur's account of the human capacity for taking action stands in opposition in important respects to two other prominent views. One of these alternatives is exemplified in the position that John Rawls holds. A second alternative appears in some interpretations of the results of neuroscientific research. My aim in this paper is first to highlight a number of the salient feature of Ricoeur's account. Then I will briefly point to some of the challenges it presents to these two alternatives
Keywords Rawls   neuroscience   narrative   action   evidence
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DOI 10.1163/156916407x185656
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