Epistemic trust and social location

Episteme 3 (1-2):109-124 (2006)
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Abstract

Epistemic trustworthiness is defined as a complex character state that supervenes on a relation between first- and second-order beliefs, including beliefs about others as epistemic agents. In contexts shaped by unjust power relations, its second-order components create a mutually supporting link between a deficiency in epistemic character and unjust epistemic exclusion on the basis of group membership. In this way, a deficiency in the virtue of epistemic trustworthiness plays into social/epistemic interactions that perpetuate social injustice. Overcoming that deficiency and, along with it, normalized practices of epistemic exclusion, requires developing a self-critical perspective on the partial, socially-located character of one's perspective and the consequent epistemic value of inclusiveness

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Nancy V. Daukas
Guilford College

Citations of this work

Trust.Carolyn McLeod - 2020 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Politics of Intellectual Self-trust.Karen Jones - 2012 - Social Epistemology 26 (2):237-251.
Epistemic injustice: A role for recognition?Paul Giladi - 2018 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 44 (2):141-158.
Two Concepts of Epistemic Injustice.David Coady - 2010 - Episteme 7 (2):101-113.

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