Philosophical Forum 33 (1):63–79 (2002)

Authors
Nancy V. Daukas
Guilford College
Abstract
This paper argues that epistemic contextualism misrepresents ordinary epistemic practices and fails to adequately respond to skepticism. It offers an alternative account of contextual variation in epistemic practices on which epistemic standards are stable, but met differently in different contexts. Contexts are determined by background presuppositions, which vary with types of inquiry. The presuppositions behind some inquiries imply that some standards of knowledge have 'already' been met. This view does not solve the skeptical problem, but aims to elucidate ordinary epistemic attitudes, and to clarify what a response to skepticism must accomplish
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DOI 10.1111/1467-9191.00081
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