Philosophical Psychology 19 (4):463-476 (2006)

Authors
Uriah Kriegel
Rice University
Abstract
In this paper we present a two-stage argument against Peter Carruthers' theory of phenomenal consciousness. The first stage shows that Carruthers' main argument against first-order representational theories of phenomenal consciousness applies with equal force against his own theory. The second stage shows that if Carruthers can escape his own argument against first-order theories, it will come at the cost of wedding his theory to certain unwelcome implausibilities. discusses Carruthers' argument against first-order representationalism. presents Carruthers' theory of consciousness. presents our argument against Carruthers' theory. sums up.
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DOI 10.1080/09515080600729348
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Quotational Higher-Order Thought Theory.Sam Coleman - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (10):2705-2733.
Review of Peter Carruthers', Consciousness: Essays From a Higher-Order Perspective. [REVIEW]Rocco J. Gennaro - 2006 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12.

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