Acta Analytica 28 (4):395-410 (2013)
In this article I examine an as yet unexplored aspect of J.P. Moreland’s defense of so-called bare particularism — the ontological theory according to which ordinary concrete particulars (e.g., Socrates) contain bare particulars as individuating constituents and property ‘hubs.’ I begin with the observation that if there is a constituency relation obtaining between Socrates and his bare particular, it must be an internal relation, in which case the natures of the relata will necessitate the relation. I then distinguish various ways in which a bare particular might be thought to have a nature and show that on none of these is it possible for a bare particular to be a constituent of a complex particular. Thus, Moreland’s attempt to resurrect bare particulars as ontologically indispensable entities is not wholly without difficulties
|Keywords||Bare particulars Constituent ontology Relations Property instances|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles
'Partially Clad' Bare Particulars Exposed.Richard Brian Davis - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):534 – 548.
Bare Particulars and Individuation Reply to Mertz.J. P. Moreland & Timothy Pickavance - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):1 – 13.
Against Zero-Dimensional Material Objects (and Other Bare Particulars).Daniel Giberman - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (2):305-321.
Substrata and Properties: From Bare Particulars to Supersubstantivalism?Matteo Morganti - 2011 - Metaphysica 12 (2):183-195.
In Defence of 'Partially Clad' Bare Particulars.Timothy Pickavance - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):155 – 158.
Universals and Particulars: Readings in Ontology.Michael J. Loux (ed.) - 1970 - University of Notre Dame Press.
Added to index2012-11-23
Total downloads50 ( #101,933 of 2,154,092 )
Recent downloads (6 months)7 ( #105,233 of 2,154,092 )
How can I increase my downloads?