Analyticity, Carnap, Quine, and truth

Philosophical Perspectives 10:281 - 296 (1996)
Quine’s paper “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” is famous for its attack on analyticity and the analytic/synthetic distinction. But there is an element of Quine’s attack that should strike one as extremely puzzling, namely his objection to Carnap’s account of analyticity. For it appears that, if this objection works, it will not only do away with analyticity, it will also do away with other semantic notions, notions that (or so one would have thought) Quine does not want to do away with, in particular, it will also do away with truth. I shall argue that there is, indeed, no way for Quine to protect truth against the type of argument he himself advanced in “Two Dogmas” against Carnap’s notion of analyticity. If he wants to keep his argument, Quine has to discard truth along with analyticity. At the end of the paper I suggest an interpretation of Quine on which he can be seen as having done just that
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.2307/2216248
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 24,433
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Greg Frost-Arnold (2011). ‘‘Quine’s Evolution From ‘Carnap’s Disciple’ to the Author of “Two Dogmas. Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 1 (2):291-316.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

481 ( #3,097 of 1,924,984 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

6 ( #140,725 of 1,924,984 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.