American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (1):43-54 (1984)
My goal is to define intending. I defend the view that believing and desiring something are necessary for intending it. They are not sufficient, however, for some things we both expect and want (e.g., the sun to rise tomorrow) are unintendable. Restricting the objects of intention to our own future actions is unwarranted and unhelpful. Rather, the belief involved in intending must be based on the desire in a certain way. En route, I argue that expected but unwanted consequences are not intended, examine the two senses of "desire," distinguish intending from being willing, and relate intending to a variety of other propositional at? titudes.
|Keywords||intention desire beleif|
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Citations of this work BETA
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The Apparent Illusion of Conscious Deciding.Joshua Shepherd - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):18 - 30.
Collective Intentional Behavior From the Standpoint of Semantics.Kirk Ludwig - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):355–393.
Moral Courage in the Workplace: Moving to and From the Desire and Decision to Act.Leslie E. Sekerka & Richard P. Bagozzi - 2007 - Business Ethics 16 (2):132–149.
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