A causal theory of intending

American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (1):43-54 (1984)
Abstract
My goal is to define intending. I defend the view that believing and desiring something are necessary for intending it. They are not sufficient, however, for some things we both expect and want (e.g., the sun to rise tomorrow) are unintendable. Restricting the objects of intention to our own future actions is unwarranted and unhelpful. Rather, the belief involved in intending must be based on the desire in a certain way. En route, I argue that expected but unwanted consequences are not intended, examine the two senses of "desire," distinguish intending from being willing, and relate intending to a variety of other propositional at? titudes.
Keywords intention  desire  beleif
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 34,562
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment1.Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.
The Myth of Practical Consistency.Niko Kolodny - 2008 - European Journal of Philosophy 16 (3):366-402.
The Apparent Illusion of Conscious Deciding.Joshua Shepherd - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):18 - 30.

View all 27 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Whither Action Theory.John M. Connolly - 1991 - Journal of Philosophical Research 16:85-106.
Normative Practical Reasoning.Christian Piller - 2001 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 75 (1):175 - 216.
Normative Practical Reasoning: John Broome.John Broome - 2001 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 75 (1):175–193.
Instrumental Rationality, Symmetry and Scope.John Brunero - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (1):125-140.
Intention and Motivational Strength.Hugh McCann - 1995 - Journal of Philosophical Research 20:571-583.
Autonomous Reasons for Intending.Randolph Clarke - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):191 – 212.
The Intentional and the Intended.J. L. A. Garcia - 1990 - Erkenntnis 33 (2):191 - 209.
A Causal Theory of Intending.Robert K. Shope - 1990 - Journal of Philosophical Research 15:361-394.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
89 ( #69,842 of 2,268,343 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
7 ( #55,609 of 2,268,343 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature