Philosophia Mathematica 6 (3):272-301 (1998)

David Corfield
University of Kent at Canterbury
In this paper I assess the obstacles to a transfer of Lakatos's methodology of scientific research programmes to mathematics. I argue that, if we are to use something akin to this methodology to discuss modern mathematics with its interweaving theoretical development, we shall require a more intricate construction and we shall have to move still further away from seeing mathematical knowledge as a collection of statements. I also examine the notion of rivalry within mathematics and claim that this appears to be significant only at a high level. In addition, ideas of ‘progress’ in mathematics are outlined.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1093/philmat/6.3.272
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 54,385
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Semantics and Cognition.Steven E. Boer - 1985 - Philosophical Review 94 (1):111.
What Is This Thing Called Science?A. F. Chalmers - 1979 - Erkenntnis 14 (3):393-404.
Why Did Einstein's Programme Supersede Lorentz's? (I).Elie Zahar - 1973 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 24 (2):95-123.

View all 28 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Mathematical Engineering and Mathematical Change.Jean‐Pierre Marquis - 1999 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 13 (3):245 – 259.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
147 ( #63,012 of 2,367,994 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
6 ( #129,014 of 2,367,994 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes