Begging the question and settling the question
In the first lecture, I presented three instances of the problem of armchair knowledge arising from the (LOT), (RED), and (WATER) arguments. In each case, there are armchair warrants for believing the premises, but it is implausible that the question whether or not the conclusion of the argument is true could be settled from the armchair
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Two Purposes of Arguing and Two Epistemic Projects.Martin Davies - 2009 - In Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes From the Philosophy of Frank Jackson. Oxford University Press. pp. 337.
Running in Circles About Begging the Question.D. A. Truncellito - 2004 - Argumentation 18 (3):325-329.
Begging the Question as Involving Actual Belief and Inconceivable Without It.David H. Sanford - 1988 - Metaphilosophy 19 (1):32–37.
Begging the Question.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1999 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (2):174 – 191.
Petitio Principii: What's Wrong?Andrea Iacona & Diego Marconi - 2005 - Facta Philosophica 7 (1):19-34.
Question-Begging Under a Non-Foundational Model of Argument.Peter Suber - 1994 - Argumentation 8 (3):241-250.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads13 ( #355,454 of 2,172,658 )
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?