Concepts, connectionism, and the language of thought

In W Ramsey, Stephen P. Stich & D. Rumelhart (eds.), Philosophy and Connectionist Theory. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. pp. 485-503 (1991)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate a _prima facie_ tension between our commonsense conception of ourselves as thinkers and the connectionist programme for modelling cognitive processes. The language of thought hypothesis plays a pivotal role. The connectionist paradigm is opposed to the language of thought; and there is an argument for the language of thought that draws on features of the commonsense scheme of thoughts, concepts, and inference. Most of the paper (Sections 3-7) is taken up with the argument for the language of thought hypothesis. The argument for an opposition between connectionism and the language of thought comes towards the end (Section 8), along with some discussion of the potential eliminativist consequences (Sections 9 and.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 86,403

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
144 (#109,523)

6 months
11 (#107,677)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

Philosophy and Memory Traces: Descartes to Connectionism.John Sutton - 1998 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Thinking with maps.Elisabeth Camp - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):145–182.
Connectionism.James Garson & Cameron Buckner - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Putting Thoughts to Work: Concepts, Systematicity, and Stimulusā€Independence.Elisabeth Camp - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2):275-311.

View all 45 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references