Defending Existentialism?

In M. Reicher (ed.), States of Affairs. Ontos Verlag. pp. 167--209 (2009)
This paper is concerned with a popular view about the nature of propositions, commonly known as the Russellian view of propositions. Alvin Plantinga has dubbed it, or more precisely, a crucial consequence of it, Existentialism, and in his paper “On Existentialism” (1983) he has presented a forceful argument intended as a reductio of this view. In what follows, I describe the main relevant ingredients of the Russellian view of propositions and states of affairs. I present a relatively simple response Russellians might want to make to Plantinga’s anti-existentialist argument. I then explore one aspect of this response—one that leads to some rather curious consequences for the Russellian view of propositions and states of affairs.
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Joseph Diekemper (2015). The Ontology of Thisness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (1):49-71.
Jeff Speaks (2012). On Possibly Nonexistent Propositions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):528-562.

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