Externalism and experience

In Ned Block, Owen Flanagan & Guven Guzeldere, The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates. MIT Press. pp. 244-250 (1997)
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Abstract

In this paper, I shall defend externalism for the contents of perceptual experience. A perceptual experience has representational properties; it presents the world as being a certain way. A visual experience, for example, might present the world to a subject as containing a surface with a certain shape, lying at a certain distance, in a certain direction; perhaps a square with sides about 30 cm, lying about one metre in front of the subject, in a direction about 20 degrees to the left of straight ahead

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Citations of this work

On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
Perception and the Reach of Phenomenal Content.Tim Bayne - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):385-404.
Perception and content.Bill Brewer - 2006 - European Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):165-181.
Smelling lessons.Clare Batty - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (1):161-174.
Externalism, architecturalism, and epistemic warrant.Martin Davies - 1998 - In C. Macdonald, Barry C. Smith & C. J. G. Wright, Knowing Our Own Minds: Essays in Self-Knowledge. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 321-363.

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