Analysis 76 (3):290-296 (2016)

Authors
Will Davies
Oxford University
Abstract
Psychiatry widely assumes an internalist biomedical model of mental illness. I argue that many of psychiatry’s diagnostic categories involve an implicit commitment to constitutive externalism about mental illness. Some of these categories are socially externalist in nature.
Keywords Psychiatry  Mental Disorder  Externalism
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DOI 10.1093/analys/anw038
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
Critique of Pure Reason.I. Kant - 1787/1998 - Philosophy 59 (230):555-557.
Freedom and Reason.Richard Mervyn Hare - 1963 - Oxford, Clarendon Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Extended Emotions.Joel Krueger & Thomas Szanto - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (12):863-878.
Dualism and Its Place in a Philosophical Structure for Psychiatry.Hane Htut Maung - 2019 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 22 (1):59-69.
Philosophy of Psychiatry.Dominic Murphy - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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The Reality of Mental Illness.Martin Roth - 1986 - Cambridge University Press.

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