Philosophical Studies 102 (3):259-79 (2001)
One might expect functionalism to imply that personal identity is preserved through various operations on the brain, including transplantation. I argue that this is not clearly so even where the whole brain is transplanted. It is definitely not so in cases where only the cerebrum is transplanted, a conceivable kind of hemispherectomy, and even certain cases in which the brain is "gradually" replaced by an inorganic substitute. These results distinguish functionalism from other accounts taking what Eric T. Olson calls the "Psychological Approach" to personal identity, enabling it to avoid some of his objections to them
|Keywords||Brain Consciousness Functionalism Metaphysics Personal Identity|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Personal Identity: The Implications of Brain Bisection and Brain Transplants.Jerome A. Shaffer - 1977 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 2 (June):147-61.
Functionalism and Type-Type Identity Theories.Frank Jackson, Robert Pargetter & E. W. Prior - 1982 - Philosophical Studies 42 (September):209-25.
What Does Functionalism Tell Us About Personal Identity?Eric T. Olson - 2002 - Noûs 36 (4):682-698.
Functionalism and Personal Identity.Lawrence H. Davis - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):781-804.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads105 ( #44,985 of 2,146,876 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #226,179 of 2,146,876 )
How can I increase my downloads?
There are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.