Religious Studies 42 (4):371 (2006)

In this paper I critically examine Brian Leftow's attempt to construct a theistic semantics for counterpossibles, one that can be used to make sense of the fact that propositions, which exist necessarily, nevertheless depend on God as their cause. I argue that the impressive theoretical framework erected by Leftow cannot guarantee an asymmetrical dependence of propositions on God, and ultimately leads to a semantic collapse in which every counterpossible comes out false. I end by defending an alternative account of God and propositions -- what I call 'theistic existentialism'. It is shown how this account underwrites a semantics for counterpossibles that conveniently avoids the problems attending Leftow's theory
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DOI 10.1017/S0034412506008559
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Impossible Worlds: A Modest Approach.Daniel Nolan - 1997 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 (4):535-572.
Actualism and Thisness.Robert Merrihew Adams - 1981 - Synthese 49 (1):3-41.
Beyond Possible Worlds.Takashi Yagisawa - 1988 - Philosophical Studies 53 (2):175 - 204.

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