How Is Weakness of the Will Possible?

In Joel Feinberg (ed.), Moral Concepts. Oxford University Press (1969)
Abstract
D. In doing x an agent acts incontinently if and only if: 1) the agent does x intentionally; 2) the agent believes there is an alternative action y open to him; and 3) the agent judges that, all things considered, it would be better to do y than to do x
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Citations of this work BETA
What in the World is Weakness of Will?Joshua May & Richard Holton - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (3):341–360.
Resisting 'Weakness of the Will'.Neil Levy - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (1):134 - 155.
Weakness of Will and Akrasia.Alfred Mele - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (3):391–404.
Reasoning with Moral Conflicts.John F. Horty - 2003 - Noûs 37 (4):557–605.

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