Horwich on 'semantic' and 'metaphysical' realism

Philosophy of Science 54 (4):539-557 (1987)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Horwich argues that we should reject metaphysical realism, but that we can preserve semantic realism by adhering to a redundancy theory of truth and a confirmationist account of linguistic understanding. But the latter will give us semantic realism only if it allows that the truth-values of sentences may transcend our recognitional capacities, and this is possible only insofar as we covertly reintroduce metaphysical realism. In spite of its intuitive appeal, we should not endorse semantic realism, but this need not bear upon the tenability of scientific realism



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 77,985

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Must Metaethical Realism Make a Semantic Claim?Guy Kahane - 2013 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (2):148-178.
The Semantic Realism/Anti-Realism Dispute and Knowledge of Meanings.Panu Raatikainen - 2009 - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 5:1-13.
Abundant truth in an austere world.Horgan Terry & Potrč Matjaž - 2006 - In Patrick Greenough & Michael P. Lynch (eds.), Truth and Realism. Oxford University Press. pp. 137--167.
The Conditions of Moral Realism.Christian Miller - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Research 34:123-155.
The metaphysical realism debate: What is at stake?Tadeusz Szubka - 2006 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 91 (1):301-316.


Added to PP

100 (#129,502)

6 months
3 (#247,888)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Add more citations

References found in this work

Putnam’s paradox.David Lewis - 1984 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (3):221 – 236.
Why there isn't a ready-made world.Hilary Putnam - 1982 - Synthese 51 (2):205--228.
Three forms of realism.Paul Horwich - 1982 - Synthese 51 (2):181 - 201.
Three kinds of scientific realism.Hilary Putnam - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (128):195-200.
Truth Conditions and Criteria.Roger Scruton & Crispin Wright - 1976 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 50:193-245.

Add more references