Horwich on 'semantic' and 'metaphysical' realism

Philosophy of Science 54 (4):539-557 (1987)
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Abstract

Horwich argues that we should reject metaphysical realism, but that we can preserve semantic realism by adhering to a redundancy theory of truth and a confirmationist account of linguistic understanding. But the latter will give us semantic realism only if it allows that the truth-values of sentences may transcend our recognitional capacities, and this is possible only insofar as we covertly reintroduce metaphysical realism. In spite of its intuitive appeal, we should not endorse semantic realism, but this need not bear upon the tenability of scientific realism

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References found in this work

Putnam’s paradox.David Lewis - 1984 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (3):221 – 236.
Why there isn't a ready-made world.Hilary Putnam - 1982 - Synthese 51 (2):205--228.
Three forms of realism.Paul Horwich - 1982 - Synthese 51 (2):181 - 201.
Three kinds of scientific realism.Hilary Putnam - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (128):195-200.
Truth Conditions and Criteria.Roger Scruton & Crispin Wright - 1976 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 50:193-245.

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