Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):151-184 (1986)
AbstractAt the level of our platitudinous background knowledge about things, speech is the expression of thought. And understanding what such expressing involves is central to understanding the relation between thinking and speaking. Part of what it is for a speech act to express a mental state is that the speech act accurately captures the mental state and can convey to others what mental state it is. And for this to occur, the speech act at least must have propositional content that somehow reflects that of the mental state, and perhaps must have other such properties as well
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An Expressivist Solution to Moorean Paradoxes.Wolfgang Freitag & Nadja-Mira Yolcu - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):5001-5024.
Self-Knowledge and Moore's Paradox.David M. Rosenthal - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 77 (2-3):195 - 209.
References found in this work
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - Cambridge University Press.