Knowledge, Truth, and Duty

New York: Oxford University Press (2001)
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Truth as the Epistemic Goal.  (pages 151-169)Marian David

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Recensioni/Reviews-Knowledge, Truth, and Duty. Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue.M. Steup, A. Fairweather & L. Zagzebski - 2004 - Epistemologia 27 (2):346.
Knowledge, truth, and duty: essays on epistemic justification, responsibility, and virtue.Matthias Steup (ed.) - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.
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Citations of this work

Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.
The Rejection of Epistemic Consequentialism.Selim Berker - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):363-387.
Does belief (only) aim at the truth?Daniel Whiting - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):279-300.
Varieties of cognitive achievement.J. Adam Carter, Benjamin W. Jarvis & Katherine Rubin - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (6):1603-1623.

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