Natural and Artifactual Objects in Contemporary Metaphysics: Exercises in Analytic Ontology

New York, NY: Bloomsbury Academic (2019)
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Abstract

What is an object? How do we look at them? Why do they matter? This collection presents a lively, timely discussion of natural and artifactual objects, considering the relationship between them from a range of philosophical perspectives, including the philosophy of biology, the metaphysics of space and the philosophy of perception. Beginning from the starting point that natural objects are bona fide, endowed with some natural border between themselves and everything else, while artifactual objects depend on the observation of tacit conventions and may include the ordinary objects of everyday life, this volume explores, contextualises and interrogates objects. Contributors discuss a variety of objects including physical, scientific and mental ones, as well as things that appear to question the limits of object-hood, including holes, Quinean 'posits' and language. The very first collection to address this growing topic within analytic philosophy, Natural and Artifactual Objects in Contemporary Metaphysics represents a highly original work, showcasing some of the most important and influential philosophers working in Europe today.

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Richard Davies
Cambridge University (PhD)

Citations of this work

Boundary.Achille C. Varzi - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Books Received. [REVIEW][author unknown] - 2020 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 28 (1):141-143.

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