Nondescriptive meaning and reference: an ideational semantics

New York: Oxford University Press (2005)
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Abstract

Wayne Davis presents a highly original approach to the foundations of semantics, showing how the so-called "expression" theory of meaning can handle names and other problematic cases of nondescriptive meaning. The fact that thoughts have parts ("ideas" or "concepts") is fundamental: Davis argues that like other unstructured words, names mean what they do because they are conventionally used to express atomic or basic ideas. In the process he shows that many pillars of contemporary philosophical semantics, from twin earth arguments to the necessity of identity, are unfounded.

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Wayne Davis
Georgetown University

Citations of this work

The double life of names.Gail Leckie - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1139-1160.
Propositions as Structured Cognitive Event‐Types.Wayne A. Davis - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):665-692.
Minimal Fregeanism.Aidan Gray - 2022 - Mind 131 (522):429-458.

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