Neither mentioning 'brains in a vat' nor mentioning brains in a vat will prove that we are not brains in a vat
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (4):891-896 (1991)
Abstract
In Reason, Truth, and History Hilary Putnam has presented an anti-skeptical argument purporting to prove that we are not brains in a vat. How exactly the argument goes is somewhat controversial. A number of competing "recon¬structions" have been proposed. They suffer from a defect which they share with what seems to be Putnam's own version of the argument. In this paper, I examine a very simple and rather natural reconstruction of the argument, one that does not employ any premises in which a sentence, viz. the sentence 'I am a brain in a vat', is mentioned rather than used. In this respect my version of the argument is importantly different from what appears to be Putnam's own version.Author's Profile
ISBN(s)
0031-8205
DOI
10.2307/2108187
My notes
Similar books and articles
Magic, semantics, and Putnam’s vat brains.Mark Sprevak & Christina Mcleish - 2003 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 35 (2):227-236.
If I am a brain in a vat, then I am not a brain in a vat.Anthony Brueckner - 1992 - Mind 101 (401):123-128.
Brains in a Vat, Subjectivity, and the Causal Theory of Reference.Kirk Ludwig - 1992 - Journal of Philosophical Research 17:313-345.
Analytics
Added to PP
2009-01-28
Downloads
134 (#95,058)
6 months
3 (#225,457)
2009-01-28
Downloads
134 (#95,058)
6 months
3 (#225,457)
Historical graph of downloads
Author's Profile
Citations of this work
Semantic self-knowledge and the vat argument.Joshua Thorpe - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2289-2306.
Using Others' Words and Drawing the Limits of the Thinkable.Yitzhak Benbaji - 2004 - Dialogue 43 (1):125-146.
Using Others' Words and Drawing the Limits of the Thinkable.Yitzhak Benbaji - 2004 - Dialogue 43 (1):125-.