Studia Logica 72 (3):339-362 (2002)
In this paper, we consider two different ways in which modus-ponens type reasoning with conditional obligations may be formalized. We develop necessary and sufficient conditions for the validity of each, and make some philosophical observations about the differences between the minor premises that each formalization requires. All this is done within the context of the Belnap-Perloff stit theory.
|Keywords||Philosophy Logic Mathematical Logic and Foundations Computational Linguistics|
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