Paradoxes of Irrationality

In Problems of Rationality. Oxford University Press. pp. 169–187 (1982)
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The author believes that large‐scale rationality on the part of the interpretant is essential to his interpretability, and therefore, in his view, to her having a mind. How, then are cases of irrationality, such as akrasia or self‐deception, judged by the interpretant's own standards, possible? He proposes that, in order to resolve the apparent paradoxes, one must distinguish between accepting a contradictory proposition and accepting separately each of two contradictory propositions, which are held apart, which in turn requires to conceive of the mind as containing a number of semi‐independent structures of interlocking beliefs, desires, emotions, memories, and other mental states.



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The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Self-Deception as Pretense.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):231 - 258.
Direction of fit and normative functionalism.Nick Zangwill - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 91 (2):173-203.

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