Reductivism, Retributivism, and the Civil Detention of Dangerous Offenders

Utilitas 9 (1):131 (1997)
The paper examines one objection to the suggestion that, rather than being subjected to extended prison sentences on the one hand, or simply released on the other, dangerous offenders should be in principle liable to some form of civil detention on completion of their normal sentences. This objection raises the spectre of a, pursuing various reductivist means outside the criminal justice system. The objection also threatens to undermine dualist theories of punishment, theories which combine reductivist and retributivist considerations. The paper attempts to refute the objection by holding that a wedge can be driven between incapacitation and other reductivist measures, and hints at a possibly new version of dualism in the process
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/S0953820800005173
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 24,479
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Douglas Husak (2013). Retributivism In Extremis. Law and Philosophy 32 (1):3-31.
Stephen J. Morse (2004). Preventive Confinement of Dangerous Offenders. Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 32 (1):56-72.
Adam J. Kolber (2009). The Comparative Nature of Punishment. Boston University Law Review 89 (5):1565-1608.
Christopher Ciocchetti (2009). Emotions, Retribution, and Punishment. Journal of Applied Philosophy 26 (2):160-173.
Richard L. Lippke (2011). Why Sex (Offending) Is Different. Criminal Justice Ethics 30 (2):151-172.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

52 ( #93,935 of 1,925,764 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

19 ( #30,766 of 1,925,764 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.