Subjectivity, Judgment, and the Basing Relationship

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (1):21-40 (2009)
Abstract
Moral and legal judgments sometimes depend on personal traits in this sense: the subject offers good reasons for her judgment, but if she had a different social or ideological background, her judgment would be different. If you would judge the constitutionality of restrictions on abortion differently if you were not a secular liberal, is your judgment really based on the arguments you find convincing, or do you find them so only because you are a secular liberal? I argue that a judgment can be based on the considerations the subject claims as justification even when it depends on personal traits.
Keywords subjectivity  basing relationship  personal traits  epistemology  the contingency problem
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2009.01327.x
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Etiological Information and Diminishing Justification.Paul Silva - 2018 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (2):1-25.

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