Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (3):253-73 (1999)

Martin Davies
University of Melbourne
This paper is about the work of a long forgotten philosopher and his views which have surprising relevance to discussions in present-day philosophy of mind and cognitive science. I argue that, far from being a traditional idealist, Mitchell advanced a very subtle position best seen as marking a transition from idealist views and later materialist accounts, the latter popularly attributed to Australian philosophers in the second half of the 20th century.
Keywords Idealism  Mind  Mysterianism  Qualia  Mitchell, William  Australian philosophy  Scottish philosophy
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DOI 10.1080/00048409912349031
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Idealist Origins: 1920s and Before.Martin Davies & Stein Helgeby - 2014 - In Graham Oppy & Nick Trakakis (eds.), History of Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer. pp. 15-54.

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