Truth as the Epistemic Goal

In M. Steup (ed.), Knowledge, Truth, and Duty. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 151-169 (2001)
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Marian David
University of Graz
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Citations of this work BETA

Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique.Thomas Kelly - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):612–640.
Does Belief (Only) Aim at the Truth?Daniel Whiting - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):279-300.
N-Rays and the Semantic View of Scientific Progress.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2008 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (2):277-278.
Aiming at Truth: Doxastic Vs. Epistemic Goals.Hamid Vahid - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (2):303-335.
The Love of Truth.Anandi Hattiangadi - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (4):422-432.

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