Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 29 (1):37-57 (1998)
Theoretical gaps of the cognitive science. First of all the gap-thesis is based on a criticism 1. of the computer-orientated cognitive science (it confuses information with the information carrier), 2. of connectivism (its linguistic borrowing from the neurobiology is not appropriate), 3. of Varelas production model (the elimination of the function of representation results in the loss of the cognitive ability). From the context of meaning and time, then the author sketches a cognitive theoretical approach, in which thinking as a (symbolic and/or subsymbolic) representation of meaning is introduced, which develops in a three-digit relation between world, language and substrate on the basis of isomorphy of time.
|Keywords||interdisciplinary extension/intension complexity subsymbolic representation structure of time three-digit relation of cognition postulate of relation|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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