The problem of armchair knowledge

In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press (2003)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

He then argues that (1), (2) and (3) constitute an inconsistent triad as follows (1991, p. 15): Suppose (1) that Oscar knows a priori that he is thinking that water is wet. Then by (2), Oscar can simply deduce E, using premisses that are knowable a priori, including the premiss that he is thinking that water is wet. Since Oscar can deduce E from premisses that are knowable a priori, Oscar can know E itself a priori. But this contradicts (3), the assumption that E cannot be known a priori. Hence (1), (2), and (3) are inconsistent. McKinsey’s conclusion is that ‘anti-individualism is inconsistent with privileged access’ (ibid.)

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,322

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
22 (#684,548)

6 months
1 (#1,520,257)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

What's wrong with Moore's argument?James Pryor - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349–378.
Imagining as a Guide to Possibility.Peter Kung - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):620-663.
Transmission Failure Failure.Nicholas Silins - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 126 (1):71-102.

View all 50 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references